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The paper analyzes the service provision of infrastructure from the 
aspect of demand risk sharing. The society benefits more under the 
public-private partnership (PPP) than under government operation, 
because the government can transfer some risks to private firms 
through PPP. To reduce total cost, the government is more likely to 
apply PPP to projects with large risk factors. Using a two-period model, 
the paper examines the dynamic features of the optimal contract under 
the PPP. The optimal incentive scheme should be stronger during 
the second than the first period. As the performance target becomes 
lower, the incentive power increases in both periods with a higher 
increase in the first period. As the intertemporal externality becomes 
stronger, the incentive power increases in both periods with a higher 
increase in the second period. As the risk or risk aversion increases, 
the incentive power decreases in both periods, which resembles the 
static feature.
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Intertemporal externality
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I. Introduction
Under public-private partnerships (PPPs), the central government or local 
authority arranges a long-term contract with a private firm for the service 
provision of building infrastructure. In this scheme, the firm takes respon- 
sibility for building infrastructure, financing investment, and operating 
the facilities for a fixed period. The government owns the facilities and the 
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private firms gain profits by operating the facilities. With revenue gener- 
ated from the operation, private firms can then recover the cost of invest- 
ment and operation.1 Under the traditional procurement of infrastructure 
service, private firms take responsibility only for building the facilities, 
whereas the government finances investment and operates the facilities. 
The main difference between the two schemes is the right of operation.
One of the main reasons for the existence of PPPs is the government 
budget pressure on infrastructure spending. PPP is generally applied to 
the building of infrastructure facilities such as roads, subways, seaports, 
airports, water system, and utilities. Currently, PPPs have also been ap- 
plied to IT systems, leisure centers, hospitals, and school buildings, and 
have even extended to asylums, barracks, and prisons. Operating these 
facilities is regarded as the responsibility of the government, with the ra- 
tionale of public good characteristics, strong externalities, or monopolistic 
inefficiency of the private provision of infrastructure. However, as the gov- 
ernment budget for infrastructure investment becomes tighter, the govern- 
ments have come up with the PPP system, through which private firms 
finance investment and the government delegates the right of operation to 
private firms for a fixed period, thereby allowing private firms to gain 
profits.
PPPs are being applied worldwide across Europe, Canada, the U.S., 
Latin America, and Asia, and their importance in the service provision of 
building infrastructure continues to increase (Malhotra 1997; Harris 2003; 
GAO 2008). Korea is one of countries that have witnessed a rapid expan- 
sion in PPPs. When PPPs first began in 1995, investment on infrastruc- 
ture by PPP was merely 0.18% of that made through traditional government 
procurement; this ratio then increased to 17.4% in 2006. The portion is 
projected to increase further.2
Bundling the tasks of building, financing, and operating a project is a 
key feature of PPP. Task bundling allows private firms to form consortiums 
that include construction firms, facility management firms, and financial 
firms to run the project and through which the government enters into a 
contract for the project. One of the most important arguments for PPPs is 
that bundling the tasks enables private firms to provide better infrastruc- 
ture service because they internalize the opportunity for efficiency. Thus, 
1 Ownership of properties belongs to the government, which makes PPP different 
from privatization. Shleifer (1998) discusses the ownership and operation between 
the government and the private sector from the contract perspective.
2 Ministry of Planning and Budget (2007).
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most studies focus on the bundling issue in a static model. Hart (2003) 
argues that PPP is better than the conventional unbundling provision if 
the quality of service is well specified. In a multi-tasking moral hazard 
model, task bundling is more efficient when there is positive externality of 
quality that improves the effort on cost-saving (Bennett and Iossa 2006; 
Iossa and Martimort 2008; Martimort and Pouyet 2008). However, Engel, 
Fischer, and Galetovic (2008) maintain that PPP does not ensure efficiency, 
because private finance does not save the distortionary taxation, and is 
equivalent to traditional procurement with regard to the burden of the 
public.
Another critical aspect of PPPs is the allocation of risks between the 
government and private firms. Private firms bear substantial risks because 
they take responsibility for the operation of the facilities for a very long 
period. The usual terms of the contract lasts over 20 years to even 50 
years. In a PPP contract, the government specifies the service provision 
requirements as well as its basic standards, but it leaves it to the private 
firms to decide on how it must provide the service and meet the pre- 
specified standards. Thus, private firms have to take a risk while providing 
service under the PPP. The previous works do not address this aspect 
directly. Kang (2006) discusses the risk-sharing aspects and compares the 
various practices of PPPs in Korea.
The current paper examines the traditional government operation and 
PPP in terms of demand risk. We apply the moral hazard model to the 
PPP scheme.3 We compare the operation level, expected total cost, and the 
expected social welfare under the two different operation schemes.
Recently in Korea, the first PPP for railroad service, the Incheon Airport 
Railroad, was transformed to traditional public operation due to the low 
demand. With an expected turnout of 200,000 passengers per day, the 
railroad between Incheon Airport and Seoul started operation in 2007; 
however, demand only realized about 7% of the projection and did not 
increase substantially. The Korean government had to compensate the 
private consortium for huge revenue losses with tax by the contract. The 
contract stipulates that if the realized demand is below 90% of the pro- 
jected demand, the government pays a subsidy proportional to the differ- 
ence of 90% of the projected demand and the realized demand. Thus, the 
Korean government ended up paying subsidy of about 100 billion Korean 
won to the private operator in 2008 and 160 billion Korean won in 2009.4 
3 The adverse selection problem is not that severe under PPPs because the 
government sets pre-specified qualifications for the contract.
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It was projected that the amount would increase over time and would 
reach 5 trillion Korean won by 2040. The public criticized the construc- 
tion of the Incheon Airport Railroad via PPP as a waste of tax money; 
consequently, the Korean government took over the right of operation 
from the private consortium in 2009.
This incident raises many issues with regard to the demand risk of 
PPPs from the dynamic perspective. Did the demand turn out to be ex- 
tremely lower than the projection because the private operator did not exert 
effort to provide better service? Was it due to the inadequately generous 
minimum revenue guarantee to the private operator? Was it because the 
private operator faced a too low incentive in the earlier stage? Was the 
contract dynamically optimal in terms of risk sharing between the govern- 
ment and the operator?
In order to examine the dynamic optimal contract of the PPP, we set up 
a two-period model and study how incentive power changes over time. 
The government tries to make the continuance of the private operation in 
the later period contingent on the performance in the earlier period as can 
be seen in the case of Incheon Airport Railroad. To capture this feature, 
we incorporate the performance evaluation into the model as an institu- 
tional factor. Considering the bundling efficiency of PPPs in a dynamic 
setting, the model takes into account intertemporal externality. The oper- 
ation effort of the operator in the earlier period can increase the demand 
in the later and earlier periods. For example, the well-known quality of 
service in a leisure center in the earlier period is likely to boost the de- 
mand in the later period due to reputation or lock-in effect, although the 
operator does not induce the operation effort in the later period.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a simple 
static model for the service provision of infrastructure with demand risk. 
We include government operation and PPP, and compare the performances 
of the two schemes in terms of expected social welfare and expected total 
cost. In Section 3, we analyze PPP in a dynamic environment by incor- 
porating intertemporal externality and performance evaluation. We identify 
the incentive scheme over time, and examine the changes in the incentive 
scheme corresponding to changes in the environment. Finally, in Section 
4, we conclude and summarize the findings of the paper.
4 Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (2009).
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 259
II. Simple Static Model
We suppose that the cost of building infrastructure facility is given fixed 
I. To focus on the risk sharing between the government and the operator, 
we assume that consumers have an inelastic demand for the service as 
follows:5
  i f 
( )
0  if  





,                      (1)
where p denotes the price of service and c the reservation price. Con- 
sumers buy the service if the price is lower than or equal to the reserva- 
tion price, otherwise they do not buy at all. It is assumed that random 
variable ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2. The 
variance captures the demand risk. e is the operation effort, and d is the 
base level of demand without effort. Here, it is assumed that operation 
effort e and shock ε are independent.6
For the account rule, we assume that the government collects revenue 
from consumers, uses a portion of it to cover the cost for management of 
the project, and spends the remaining revenue for consumers. Thus, the 
revenue net of the cost is social welfare. The revenue is approximately R 
≈c(d＋e＋ε ), which is the value evaluated at the reservation price c for a 
sufficiently large base level of demand compared to variance, σ 2, and the 
expected revenue to E (R )≈c(d＋e ).
Inducing an operation effort costs the operator, we denote m(e
2/2) to 
be the cost of the operation effort. The coefficient m accounts for effi- 
ciency by bundling effect. If a private firm operates the facilities, such 
firm could operate at a lower cost than the government with the same 
operation effort level due to the bundling opportunity. As the operation 
becomes less efficient, m becomes higher. Thus, m is lower for the PPP 
than for the government operation. We set m as 1 for the PPP, which is 
5 Thus, we do not analyze how the service price is determined.
6 The effort of the private operator might affect the shock, but it would be very 
difficult for the private operator to affect the risk itself because the fluctuation 
arises from the behavior of the demanders. In the context of accounting reporting 
system, Son-Ku Kim (2005) analyzes a multi-period principal-agent model in which 
an agent can influence the variance as well as the mean of a firm’s income stream. 
He shows that the contractual efficiency increases as the reporting frequency in- 
creases. See Kim (2005).
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greater than or equal to 1 for the government operation.
The citizens of a country have to bear the demand risk. For simplicity, 
we use the mean-variance utility function for the expected utility. We 
assume the risk attitude of agents in the society to be as follows: 
Assumption 1. The private sector is risk-averse and the government is 
risk-neutral. 
We denote r to be the common degree of risk-aversion of consumers 
and the private operator, and Var(x) variance of the variable x. We re- 
present the risk cost as r { Var(x )/2}. Then, we denote TC as the total 
cost to manage the project or the operation cost and risk cost, which is 
assumed to be financed by taxes. Social welfare represented as W＝c (d
＋e＋ε )－TC.
A. Government Operation
The government exerts operation effort to increase revenues and covers 
the operation cost and risk cost from the revenue. As the revenue de- 
creases, consumers have less benefit from the government. Given that 
the risk to society is from the fluctuation of revenue and the government 
does not share the risk with the private firms under the government 
operation, the risk cost is represented as r { Var(R )/2}＝r {(σ 2c2)/2}. The 
government itself does not cover the cost generated from a shock with 
insurance, but it makes people take all the cost from the shock by 
reducing the benefit. This means that risk cost forms part of the costs 
that society has to take. Thus, the total cost is TC＝m(e
2/2)＋r {(σ 2c2)/2}.
The expected welfare is given by:
2 2 2
( ) ( ) .
2 2
e cE W c d e m r σ= + − −
                
 (2)
The government chooses the operation effort to maximize the expected 




                             (3)
The risk-neutral government does not consider the social demand risk 
for choosing the operation level, because it does not have the incentive 
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to share the risk. The government induces less effort as the government 
operation becomes less efficient.
We obtain the expected total cost7 and the expected social welfare 
from the government operation as follows:
2 2 2 21 1 1 1( ) ( )  and ( ) ( ) .
2 2
E TC r c EW cd r c
m m
σ σ= + = + −
       (4)
As the operation is less efficient, both the expected total cost and the 
expected social welfare are lower. As the risk factor increases, the ex- 
pected total cost increases whereas the expected social welfare decreases.
B. PPP
We interpret the PPP contract in a principal-agent framework; therefore, 
we treat the government as a principal and the private operator as an 
agent of service provision. The operation effort is unverifiable and cannot 
be contracted upon because of the demand risk. When the demand is 
low, the private operator can assert that the market condition is not 
good, although it exerted sufficient operation effort. When demand is 
high, without the operation effort, the private operator can maintain 
that it is a result of the operation effort it has exerted.
The government and the private operator share risks by dividing the 
revenue between two parties. The risk-neutral government offers transfer, 
t, to the private operator to induce operation effort. With the transfer, 
the private operator covers the operation cost and risk cost for the service 
provision. Thus, the transfer in PPP scheme is comparable to the total 
cost in the government operation scheme. As the private operator is 
risk-averse, it pays the risk cost because of demand risk. The risk cost 
to the private operator is represented by r {Var(t)/2}, where Var(t) denotes 
variance of the transfer. The utility of the operator is the transfer net of 
the disutility and the risk cost, U＝t－(e
2/2)－r {Var(t)/2}. For simplicity, 
we use the mean-variance utility function for the expected utility of the 
private operator given by E(U )＝E(t )－(e
2/2)－r {Var(t )/2}.
We consider a linear transfer scheme, t＝α＋βR, which is known to 
be robust to the specifications (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). α  is the 
fixed subsidy to the operator, and is paid regardless of the revenue level. 
7 The total cost is independent of the error term, because the government does 
not consider the risk when it chooses the operation level. Thus, the expected 
total cost is merely the total cost itself.
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Meanwhile, β  is the share of the revenue belonging to the private oper- 
ator, where share 1－β  goes to the government and share β  captures 
the intensity of the incentive scheme. There is a trade-off between the 
incentive and risk sharing. Under a payment system of the user fee 
only characterized as α＝0 and β＝1, the private operator has the 
strongest incentive to raise revenues, but bears all the demand risk. 
Under a payment scheme of availability only represented as α＞0 and β
＝0, the private operator receives a fixed fee from the government and 
the government takes all the risk; however, the private operator has no 
incentive to raise revenues.
The optimal linear contract maximizes the expected social welfare, 
making the private operator sign the contract and inducing the oper- 
ation effort level that is best for the private operator. The government 
should provide the private operator with the expected utility greater 
than or equal to a certain level8 to induce the private operator to take 
the project. The private operator does the best to protect its interest, 
taking into account the cost related to the operation effort and the risk 
as well as the share of the revenue. Thus, the contract can align the 
private operator’s effort both to social welfare and its own interest.
The problem is that the government chooses α  and β  to maximize 
the expected social welfare as follows:
( ) (1 ) ( ) .E W c d eα β= − + − +                      (5)
st. 
(i) The participation constraint is given by:
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) 0.
2 2
e cE U c d e r β σα β= + + − − ≥
              
(6)
(ii) The incentive compatibility constraint is given by:
2 2 2 2
max ( ) ( ) .
2 2e
e cE U c d e r β σα β
′
= + + − −
            
(7)
We set the reservation utility of the private operator as zero for simpli- 
city. From the incentive compatibility constraint (7), the best operation 
8 For simplicity, the reservation level is set to 0 in the paper. 
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level is given as:
.e cβ=                             (8)
The operation effort is proportional to the incentive, because the private 
operator shares in the revenue of the PPP.
The optimal linear payment scheme pays only the reservation utility, 
because the participation constraint should be binding. Thus, α  is de- 
termined from Equation 6 with the equality. By substituting α  into 
Equation 5, we transform the expected social welfare as follows:
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) .
2 2
e cE W c d e r β σ= + − −
                 
(9)
By substituting the incentive compatibility constraint e＝βc (Equation 
8) into Equation 9, we have the following expected social welfare:
2
2 2(1 )max ( ) .
2
rc d c c
β
σβ β++ −
                (10)
The government chooses β  to maximize the expected social welfare, and 
α  is determined by the participation constraint with β . The government 








+                       (11)





+                           (12)
At the margin, as one unit of operation effort increases, the expected 
social welfare increases by the fixed amount, c, regardless of the level of 
operation effort. On the other hand, as one unit of operation effort in- 
creases, the expected social welfare decreases in proportion to the level 
of operation effort exerted at the rate of effort-inducing cost, 1, and the 
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rate of risk cost, rσ 2. This is because the operation effort costs disutility 
to the firm, and the government has to compensate it for risk sharing 
in order to induce the firm to exert effort. Thus, the term, 1＋rσ 2, re- 
presents the rate of the cost of the second-best contract. Share  β  then 
represents the ratio of welfare gain to the rate of welfare cost of the 
second best contract at the unit price of the service provision.
From the discussion on the feature of the optimal contract, it is ob- 
vious that, in order to balance the trade-off between incentive and risk 
sharing, the incentive power of the optimal contract should be reduced 
corresponding to the higher demand risk and risk aversion of the pri- 
vate operator. We can interpret this feature in a dynamic setting where 
demand risk is becoming smaller because of learning by doing. As the 
private operator runs the project, both the private operator and the gov- 
ernment know the demand situation better. The private operator should 
bear the demand risk more and the incentive increases as time goes on.
We obtain the expected transfer and the expected social welfare from 
the PPP as follows:
2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1( )  and ( ) .
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
E t c E W cd c
r rσ σ
= = +
+ +        (13)
As the risk factor increases, both the expected transfer and expected 
social welfare decrease.
C. Government Operation vs. PPP
As mentioned earlier, we aim to evaluate government operation and PPP 
in terms of the expected social welfare and expected total cost. The ex- 
pected social welfare is the primary criterion for comparing the two 
schemes. However, considering that the PPP has been conceived to avoid 
budget pressure on infrastructure spending, the size of the expected total 
cost of each scheme is also critical in choosing a scheme for a specific 
project.
The society benefits more from PPP than from government operation. 
The expected social welfare is higher under PPP than under government 
operation, regardless of the operation level. By considering m≥1, this 
point can be seen easily when the expected social welfare in Equations 
4 and 13 are compared. This is due to the fact that the government can 
reduce the risk cost by transferring some of the demand risk to private 
firms under the PPP, which it cannot do under traditional government 
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operation. Using Equations 3 and 8, we can identify the incentive dif- 
ference of the two schemes in terms of risk sharing. Under PPP, private 
firms take into account the demand risk when they choose their oper- 
ation level.
Proposition 1. The society benefits more from PPP than from traditional 
government operation.
From the proposition, we can see that PPP is preferable to traditional 
government operation because of the advantages of risk sharing and 
the bundling effect. Both this paper and earlier works show the same 
result of the welfare comparison, although this paper evaluates two 
schemes in the aspect of risk sharing, whereas earlier research have 
done so in terms of bundling effect. It should be noted that the welfare 
comparison in this work is not dependent on the bundling effect. Thus, 
even when there is no bundling efficiency, which is represented as m＝
1, the expected social welfare is higher under PPP than under govern- 
ment operation. The welfare gain from the PPP stems from risk sharing 
and not from the bundling effect. 
Another important issue related to the operating scheme is identifying 
under which scheme the expected total cost is lower compared with 
others. In practice, when the government chooses an operating scheme 
for infrastructure service provision, it compares two schemes in terms 
of the expected total costs rather than the expected social welfare. The 
relative size of the expected total cost is dependent on operation efficiency 
and risk factor, as we can see from the total costs shown in Equations 
4 and 13. If m≤1＋rσ 2, the expected total cost is always lower under 
PPP than under government operation. We can interpret m≤1＋ rσ 2 to 
mean that the risk factor is more significant than operation efficiency. 
This means that when the risk factor is considerably large, the govern- 
ment can substantially reduce the expected total cost by transferring 
the demand risk to private firms. If m＞1＋rσ 2, the relative size of the 
expected total costs is indefinite. For a fairly small risk factor, the total 
cost could be higher under PPP than under government operation. This 
is because the government pays the private firm a considerably large risk 
cost in order to induce a high operation effort from the private firm. In 
this case, the government could decrease expected total cost by operating 
the facilities itself. This implies that the government is more likely to 
apply PPP to projects with high risk factor under the budget pressure.
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III. Dynamic Optimal Contract under PPP
PPP has a long-term contract feature and requires operation effort from 
the private operator to enhance demand in the earlier period and ensure 
a long-lasting effect on the demand in the later period. The effort of the 
private operator in the earlier period can have a positive effect on demand 
in the later period. The government would then want to have the project 
to be continued in the later period for as long as possible. Knowing that 
the project is likely to be long term, the private operator may not exert 
sufficient operation effort during the earlier period. Responding to that 
possibility, the government tries to induce effort in the earlier period by 
adopting performance evaluation. Thus, the contract can take into ac- 
count the intertemporal externality of the operation effort and the per- 
formance evaluation.
We can imagine two probable positions for the incentive scheme over 
time. On one hand, the private operator may argue that the project can 
end earlier than the desired time point if the environment is insecure in 
the early stage, because they cannot meet the costs with unexpected low 
demand. Thus, they can demand more security in the early period to 
continue the operation. On the other hand, the government may maintain 
that if the private operator does not exert sufficient effort in the earlier 
period, the project can terminate earlier than the preferred time point 
due to low demand. Therefore, the government may induce the private 
operator to face the stronger incentive to keep on the project. Both of 
the positions are reasonable. The paper analyzes which position is sup- 
ported by the dynamic optimal contract.
A. Model
Assume that there are two periods of the contract. The demand for 
the service provision in the first and second periods is as follows:
                 
1
1
  i f 
( ) ,
0  if   





                                            (14)
                 
1 2
2
  i f 
( ) ,
0  if   
d e e p c
D p
p c
λ ε+ + + ≤⎧
= ⎨ >⎩
where D1(p) and D2(p) denote the first and second period demands, 
respectively, and e1 and e2 denote the first and second period operation 
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efforts of the private operator, respectively.
The operation effort in the first period affects the second period demand 
as well as the first period demand. Here λ  captures the degree of the 
intertemporal externality of the first period operation effort. We assume 
that for the second period demand, the first period operation effort is 
effective, but it is no more effective than the second period operation 
effort. Thus, we set 0＜λ＜1.9 The intertemporal externality is the dy- 
namic feature of the positive externality of the bundling in the static 
model.
The government offers the linear transfer scheme of two periods, (α 1
＋β1R1, α 2＋β2R2). Here, the transfer to the private operator in the second 
period is contingent on the performance evaluation. If the private operator 
passes the performance evaluation in the first period, the private operator 
continues with the project and obtains the transfer in the second period. 
If the private operator fails, the government takes over the right of op- 
eration and the private operator gets nothing in the second period. We 
assume that the performance target of the period one is set and the 
probability to pass the performance review is given δ , with 0＜δ＜1. We 
capture the intensity of the performance target with the probability δ . 
The higher the performance target, the lower the probability of the con- 
tinuance.
The optimal linear contract maximizes the expected social welfare over 
two periods, making the private operator sign the contract and inducing 
the best operation effort level for each period for the private operator. 
The government should provide the private operator with the expected 
utility that is greater than or equal to 0 in each period in order to in- 
duce the private operator to take the project. If the expected utility of 
the first period is less than 0, the private operator may not want to be 
involved with the project. If the expected utility of the second period is 
less than 0, the private operator may try to stop operating the facilities 
even though it passes the performance evaluation after the first period. 
The private operator performs what is best for its interest over two 
periods, taking into account the intertemporal externality of the first 
9 It is possible that the first period effort is more effective than the second 
period effort for the second period demand. In this case, the first period effort is 
dominant, and the importance of the second period effort becomes negligible. 
Thus, the contract is very likely to be renewed towards the second period as a 
reward for the high demand in the second period, even though the performance 
in the first period is poor. Thus, the dynamic contract of the two periods is not 
that critical for inducing operation effort.
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period operation effort.
The problem occurs when the government chooses α 1, β1, α 2, and β2 
to maximize the expected social welfare as follows:
[ ]
1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2, , ,
max (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) .c d e c d e e
α β α β
α β δ α β λ− + − + + − + − + +
    (15)
st. 
(i) The participation constraints are given by:
        
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0,2 2
e cE U c d e r β σα β= + + − − ≥
       (16)
        
and
 
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) 0.2 2
e cE U c d e e r β σα β λ= + + + − − ≥
(ii) The incentive compatibility constraint is given by:
        1 2





e cc d e r β σα β+ + − − +
   (17)
        
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 1 2( ) .2 2
e cc d e e r β σδ α β λ
⎡ ⎤
+ + + − −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
From the incentive compatibility constraints, we can obtain the first 
order conditions as follows:
                        e1＝β1c＋δλβ2c  of  e1,
         and  e2＝β2c  of  e2.                           (18)
The optimal linear payment scheme pays just the reservation utility 
for each period, because the participation constraint should be binding. 
Thus, α 1 and α 2 are determined from Equation 16 with the equality. By 
substituting α 1 and α 2 into Equation 15, we transform the expected 
social welfare as follows:
1 2
2 2 22 2 2 2
2 21 1
1 1 2,
max ( ) ( ) .
2 2 2 2
e ce cc d e r c d e e r
β β
β σβ σ δ λ
⎡ ⎤
+ − − + + + − −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦  
(19)
By substituting the incentive compatibility conditions (18) into the welfare 
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function (19), we have the expected dynamic social welfare function given 
by:
     1 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1
1 2,
( )max ( ( ) )
2 2
c cc d c r
β β
β δλβ β σβ δλβ ++ + − −
     (20)




1 2 2( ) ) 2
cc d c c r β σδ λ β δλβ β
⎡ ⎤
+ + + + −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
The government chooses β1 and β2 to maximize the expected social wel- 
fare, and α 1 and α 2 is determined by the participation constraint β1 and 
β2.
Next, we obtain the first order conditions of β1 and β2 for the maxi- 
mization as follows:
2
1 2 1 11 ( ) 0e rβ δλβ β σ δλ− + − + =  of β1,             (21)
and
2 2
1 2 2 2( ) 1 0rλ λ β δλβ δλ β σ β− + + + − − =  of β2.        (22)
Solving the two first order conditions of β1 and β2, we have β1 and β2 
as follows:
2 2






σ δ σ λ
+ +=
+ +                    
(23)
and
2 2 2 2





σ λ σ δλ σβ
σ δ σ λ
+ + +=
+ +                
 (24)
By substituting (23) and (24) into (18), we have e1 and e2 as follows:
2 2 2 2 2 2




r r r r r
e c
r r
σ δλ σ δλ σ λ σ δλ σ
σ δ σ λ
⎡ ⎤+ + + + + +⎣ ⎦=
+ +        
(25)
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2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 .
(1 )
r r re c
r r
σ λ σ δλ σ
σ δ σ λ
+ + +=
+ +                  
(26)
As the intertemporal externality becomes negligible, the share in the 
two periods becomes similar and approaches the static share. This means 







. In case there is no correlation over time, 
the contract can be implemented as the static case. This refers to the 
so-called false dynamics.10
The denominator of β1 and β2, which is the rate of the welfare cost of 
the second-best contract, is the sum of the compound of the stationary 
rate of the cost of the second-best contract in two periods, (1＋rσ2)2, 
and the dynamic welfare cost. The discounted rate of risk cost in period 
one affects the second period transfer, δ rσ 2λ2. The numerator of β1, 
which is the welfare gain in the first period evaluated at the welfare 
cost, is the sum of the stationary rate of the cost of the second-best 
contract in the first period, 1＋rσ 2, and the dynamic welfare gain or the 
discounted risk cost of the first period affecting the second period 
transfer, δλrσ 2. The numerator of β2, which is the welfare gain in the 
first period evaluated at the welfare cost, is the sum of the stationary 
rate of the cost of the second-best contract in the second period, 1＋
rσ 2, and the dynamic welfare gain or the sum of the risk cost in period 
one affecting the first period transfer evaluated at the second period 
transfer, λrσ 2, and the discounted risk cost in period one affecting the 
second period transfer, δλ2rσ 2.
As we compare the incentive power of the first and second periods of 
the dynamic optimal contract,  β1＜β2 as
[ ]2






σ λ δ λ
β β




Proposition 2. The optimal incentive is more high-powered in the second 
period than in the first period.
One of the main goals of the dynamic contract is to induce the first 
period operation level to be sufficiently beneficial from the dynamic ex- 
ternality. By setting the incentive in the second period to be higher than 
10 Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) provide detailed 
descriptions of the effects of different correlations over time on the contract.
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in the first period, the contract can provide gain from the dynamic ex- 
ternality with lower risk cost. If the incentive in the first period is higher 
than or equal to that in the second period, the operation effort level is 
higher in the first period than in the second period based on Equation 
18. It means that in the first period, the incentive should be high, but 
the risk cost should also be high. However, if the government sets the 
incentive in the first period to be lower than that in the second period, 
it can ensure sufficient operation effort level with much lower risk cost 
in the first period. In this way, the government could balance the gain 
of the dynamic externality and the risk cost dynamically.
The dynamic incentive scheme is the same as in Rogerson’s (1985). The 
underlying factor is the dynamic externality in this paper and the differ- 
ence of the risk-averseness for the principal and the agent in Rogerson’s 
paper.
B. Comparative Static for the Dynamic Optimal Contract
We examine how the incentive power of the contract responds to the 
changes of performance target, intertemporal externality, and risk factor. 
The sign and relative size of the changes of incentive are critically depen- 
dent on how the intertemporal externality affects the operation effort and 
the revenue in two periods.
The incentive in both periods should increase as the probability of 
passing the performance evaluation increases as follows:
2 2 2
1
22 2 2 2




β σ λ λ σ σ
δ σ δ σ λ
∂ − + += >
∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦               
(27)
and 
2 2 2 2
2





β σ λ λ σ σ
δ σ δ σ λ
∂ − += >
∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦                
(28)
The lower performance target could increase revenue much more than 
the total cost in both periods. As the probability of passing the perfor- 
mance evaluation becomes higher, the private operator increases the 
operation effort at the same risk cost in the first period. The revenue 
increases as the operation effort level increases in the first period. Thus, 
there is a room to increase the risk cost in the first period, although 
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the operation cost increases. As the operation effort in the first period 
increases, the social welfare increases in the second period at the same 
risk cost because of intertemporal externality. Thus, there is also a room 
to increase the risk cost in the second period despite the increase in 
operation cost. Therefore, the incentive should be higher both in the first 
and second periods to raise social welfare, corresponding to the lower 
performance target.
We compare the relative changes in the incentives in two periods to 
the changes in the probability of passing the performance evaluation. 
There should be a higher increase in incentive in the first period than 
in the second period. This is expressed as: 
2 2 2
21
22 2 2 2




ββ σ λ λ σ λ σ
δ δ σ δ σ λ
∂∂ − + + −− = >
∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦         
(29)
Proposition 3. As the performance target becomes lower, the optimal 
incentive power increases in both periods, resulting in a higher increase 
in the incentive in the first period.
As the incentive increases in both periods, the operation effort level in- 
creases in both periods. Suppose that the incentive increases at the 
same rate in two periods. There is a higher increase in the operation level 
in the first period than in the second period because of intertemporal 
externality. Thus, there is a higher increase in revenue in the first period 
than in the second period even with the same increase in the risk cost 
of the two periods. Furthermore, there is a higher increase in social 
welfare because of the increase in operation effort level of the first period 
more than of the second period. Thus, there is more room to increase 
the risk cost in the first period than in the second period. Therefore, 
the government should raise the incentive higher in the first period than 
in the second period.
We also check out how the incentive power of the contract changes 
as the degree of intertemporal externality varies. The incentive should 
increase in the second period as follows:
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
22 2 2 2
(1 2 )(1 ) 2 (1 )
0.
(1 )
r r r r
r r
σ δλ σ δλ σ δλ σβ
λ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤+ + − + −∂ ⎣ ⎦= >
∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦      
(30)
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 273
The value in the parenthesis of the numerator of∂β2/∂λ  is a quadratic 
in λ  and has its maximum at the value larger than 1. The value in the 
parenthesis of the numerator of∂β2/∂λ  at λ＝0 is (1＋rσ
2)2＞0. The 
value in the parenthesis of the numerator of∂β2/∂λ  at λ＝1 is (1＋2δ ) 
(rσ 2)2＋(2＋δ )rσ2＋1 and positive. Thus,∂β2/∂λ  is positive.
The larger intertemporal externality causes the social welfare in the 
second period to be higher directly without any change in the operation 
effort level. Thus, the incentive in the second period should increase 
because the social welfare gain outweighs the increase in the total cost.
However, the change in incentive power in the first period is indef- 
inite for the change in intertemporal externality. We can show this using 
the following equation:
2 2 2 2 2 2
1
22 2 2 2
(1 ) 2 (1 )
.
(1 )
r r r r
r r
δ σ σ λ σ δλ σβ
λ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤+ − + −∂ ⎣ ⎦=
∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦            (31)
The value in the parenthesis of the numerator of ∂β1/∂λ  is a quadratic 
in λ  and has its maximum at the value larger than 1. The value in the 
parenthesis of the numerator of ∂β1/∂λ  at λ＝0 is (1＋rσ
2)2＞0. The 
value in the parenthesis of the numerator of ∂β1/∂λ  at λ＝1 is (rσ
2)2－
δ rσ 2－1, which is indefinite.
As the intertemporal externality increases, the operation effort level 
increases in the first period without any change in the risk cost. How- 
ever, the operation effort level increases in line with the increase in the 
incentive in the second period. This could lead to an excessive increase 
in the operation cost in the first period. In this case, the incentive in 
the first period should be lower to offset the increase in the operation 
cost in the same period. Moreover, if the increase in revenue outweighs 
the increase in the operation cost, then the incentive in the first period 
should be higher in order to increase the social welfare.
We compare the relative changes in incentives in the two periods to 
the changes in intertemporal externality. There should be a higher in- 
crease in incentive in the second period than in the first period, as the 
intertemporal externality increases as follows:
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
21
22 2 2 2
( 1) 2 (1 ) ( 1)(1 )
0.
(1 )
r r r r
r r
σ δ δ σ λ δ σ λ δ σββ
λ λ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤− − − + + − +∂∂ ⎣ ⎦− = <
∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦  
(32)
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Proposition 4. As the degree of the intertemporal externality increases, 
the optimal incentive power increases in the second period. The incentive 
in the first period increase less than that in the second period.
In the case of a decrease in incentive in the first period, an obviously 
higher relative increase of the incentive in the second period can be ob- 
served. Consider the case of the increase in the incentive in the first 
period. The increase in intertemporal externality increases the revenue 
of the second period directly and indirectly through the increase in op- 
eration effort in the first period. However, it increases revenue in the 
first period only indirectly through the increase in operation effort in the 
same period. Thus, in this case, in order to increase social welfare, there 
is more room to increase the risk cost in the second period than in the 
first period. The increase of the incentive should, therefore, be higher in 
the second period than in the first period.
Now, we investigate how the incentive power of the optimal contract 
responds to the changes in demand risk and risk attitude of the private 
operator. As expected, the incentive power decreases as the risk or risk 
aversion increases in both periods. This is because the essence of the 
contract is to balance the incentive to induce operation effort and risk 
sharing. Thus, incentive power should be adjusted inversely to the risk 
or risk aversion. This result has the same feature as that of static opti- 
mal contract given by:
2 2 2 2 2
1
22 2 2 2 2
( 1)(1 ) 2 (1 )
0,
( ) (1 )
r r r
r r r
δλ σ δλ σ σ δλβ
σ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤− + − + −∂ ⎣ ⎦= <




22 2 2 2 2
( 1) 2 (1 )( )
0.
( ) (1 )
r r
r r r
λ σ λ δλ σβ
σ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤− − − + +∂ ⎣ ⎦= <
∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦          
(34)
Proposition 5. As the risk or risk aversion increases, the optimal in- 
centive power decreases in both periods.
However, the relative change in incentive power is indefinite for the 
change in the risk or risk aversion expressed as:
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2 2
21
22 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ( 1) ( )
.
( ) ( ) (1 )
r
r r r r
λ δ δ λ σββ
σ σ σ σ δλ
⎡ ⎤− + − +∂∂ ⎣ ⎦− =
∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦            
(35)
If the risk or risk aversion is relatively large ( rσ 2＞1), the incentive should 
decrease less in the first period. When the risk or risk aversion is large, 
the incentive is small in the second period. However, the incentive in 
the first period is very small because the incentive should be smaller in 
the first period than in the second period. Thus, there is not much 
room to reduce the incentive in the first period.
IV. Conclusion
Demand risk is an important feature of the service provision of building 
infrastructure regardless of the operation scheme. In particular, PPP is 
profoundly associated with demand risk because of the long-term con- 
tract. Thus, a critical aspect of any PPP contract is the allocation of de- 
mand risk between the government and the private operator. The earlier 
studies focused on the bundling effect and did not deal with risk sharing 
characteristics. Thus, this paper analyzes the service provision of infra- 
structure in terms of demand risk.
From the risk-sharing perspective, we characterize the traditional gov- 
ernment operation and PPP with a simple static model. Under government 
operation, the government considers operation efficiency and not demand 
risk when it chooses the operation level. The government induces less 
operation effort because the government operation is less efficient. On 
the other hand, under PPP, the government transfers some of the demand 
risks to the private operator, and the incentive for the private operator 
is determined inversely by the risk factor.
We compare government operation and PPP in terms of expected social 
welfare and expected total cost. The society benefits more from PPP than 
from government operation, because there is opportunity of risk sharing 
between the government and the private operator through PPP. The 
result is the same as that obtained in previous works focusing on the 
bundling effect of PPP. This paper finds another supporting argument 
for PPP that differs from those obtained by earlier research. Considering 
the expected total cost structure, the government is likely to apply PPP 
rather than government operation to the projects with a high demand 
risk.
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Taking into account the performance evaluation, we derive the dynamic 
optimal contract for the PPP in a two-period model with intertemporal 
externality. The optimal incentive is such that the private operator bears 
less risk in the earlier period and the incentive is high in the later 
period. This level of incentive can be attributed to dynamic externality, 
which works favorably on the first period effort. Thus, there is room to 
reduce the risk cost while inducing sufficient operation level by setting 
the incentive lower in the first period.
The paper analyzes the response of the incentive in each period to the 
change in the dynamic environment. As the performance target becomes 
lower, the incentive power increases in both periods. The incentive should 
increase more in the first period than in the second period, because the 
increase in the incentive of the first period can cause a higher raise in 
revenue more at the same risk cost. As the intertemporal externality 
becomes stronger, the incentive power increases in the second period. 
The incentive should increase more in the second than in the first 
period, because the increase in intertemporal externality can boost the 
revenue in the second period both directly and indirectly. As the risk 
factor increases, the incentive power decreases in both periods. This 
result resembles the static feature.
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